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Chapter 5
TAXATION AND REGULATION
OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
5.1 Introduction
Since the beginning of the financial crisis numerous
proposals have been made for the reform of public
policies towards banks and other financial companies.
Many individual governments have already taken
action, and several official international bodies have
also been active in considering reform. Reform pro-
posals have taken two forms. One form is for new, or
amended, regulations on banks and financial compa-
nies. A second is for new taxes on banks and other
financial companies. 
This chapter analyses options for the taxation and
regulation of banks and other financial companies. It
compares and contrasts the two alternative approach-
es of taxation and regulation as a means to achieving
various objectives. And it analyses the interaction
between regulations and taxation when both are
implemented simultaneously. 
The aims and objectives of regulations and tax are
not identical. Most financial regulatory proposals
fall under two distinct objectives. The first is to
reduce the probability of default in individual banks
or other financial companies, and in particular in
systemically important banks. This has been
addressed in a number of ways. For example, the
Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS)
has proposed significant reform of its system of cap-
ital and liquidity requirements as part of a Basel III
package (BCBS 2010a). And the US Dodd-Frank
Act has introduced many new provisions, including
restricting the trading activities of some financial
companies. 
The second objective is to put in place a resolution
mechanism that can adequately deal with cases where
banks or other financial companies reach positions of
financial distress despite regulations designed to pre-
vent them from doing so. For example, the European
Commission has been active in developing a new res-
olution mechanism within the European Union
(European Commission 2010a, b). The aim of the
mechanism is “to facilitate the resolution of failing
banks in ways which avoid contagion, allow the bank
to be wound down in an orderly manner and in a
timeframe which avoids the ‘fire sale’ of assets”
(European Commission 2010a). 
There are also two distinct objectives for tax policy.
The first is simply to raise revenue. This could be for
at least two reasons: to reimburse governments for the
costs of the last financial crisis, and to build up suffi-
cient funds for them to be able to deal with the next
one. The explicit aim of the Financial Responsibility
Fee proposed in the United States was the former:
“My commitment is to recover every single dime the
American people are owed”said President Obama, on
January 14, 2010, in a White House press release. In
addition, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
was asked by the September 2009 G20 meeting “to
prepare a report on how the financial sector could
make a ‘fair and substantial contribution’ to meeting
the costs associated with government interventions to
repair it” (IMF 2010b). The latter is closely related to
the design of a resolution mechanism, and in particu-
lar is associated with building a resolution fund that is
financed by a tax on the financial sector.
The second objective of tax policy is more closely
linked with regulation: namely, Pigouvian taxes
could be introduced with the aim of affecting the
behaviour of the financial sector in a similar way to
regulations. Proposals here include new taxes on
bank liabilities, and on bank bonuses. For example,
the IMF has proposed a Financial Securities
Contribution (FSC), based broadly on liabilities,
which might have similar effects as the Basel capital
requirements. The choice and interaction between
taxation and regulation is particularly important in
this area. 
This chapter cannot cover all aspects of the taxation
and regulation of the financial sector. It therefore
limits itself primarily to a discussion of taxation
policies, with a particular focus on where these may
overlap or conflict with regulation. The chapter
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tion aside: it neither discusses the design of a reso-
lution mechanism nor issues of competition within
the financial sector such as whether some large
banks should be broken up, or whether their activi-
ties should be restricted. 
The chapter proceeds in the next section by first set-
ting out a summary of the causes of the financial cri-
sis. This is a necessary first step to analysing and
understanding the role of alternative policies
designed to affect behaviour in the financial sector:
effective policy should be targeted towards the under-
lying causes of the crisis. The chapter then contains a
somewhat broad discussion of the relative merits of
taxation and regulation as ways of improving the
outcome of behaviour in the financial sector for soci-
ety as a whole. The section also contains a brief sum-
mary of the key relevant taxation and regulatory pro-
posals that have been made in response to the finan-
cial crisis. 
Sections 5.4 and 5.5 address in turn the two objectives
of taxation: to raise revenue and to influence behav-
iour to prevent a subsequent crisis. We discuss the
appropriate design of taxation in each case, and par-
ticularly in the second case we contrast the options of
taxation and regulation, and highlight issues which
arise if both forms of intervention are used simulta-
neously. Section 5.6 concludes. 
5.2 Underlying causes of the crisis
There were clearly many elements that contributed to
the onset and scale of the financial crisis. In order to
identify policies that may help to reduce the probabil-
ity of future crises, it is useful first to identify some of
the more important factors that created the recent cri-
sis. We will do this briefly, since other contributions
have already provided a comprehensive analysis of the
causes of the crisis.1
Two key factors are liquidity and solvency. Banks use
short-term debt to provide long-term loans. There are
clear benefits from this to society: funds can be pooled
to allow investment in long-term illiquid assets, while
meeting the expected demands for individuals’ short-
term liquidity needs. However, as Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) demonstrated, in such a situation any
cost to the liquidation of long-term assets is likely to
result in banks being inherently fragile, and susceptible
to demands from short-term debtholders. The exis-
tence of deposit insurance reduces such fragility, as
deposit holders are protected and hence less likely to
create a bank run. By acting as lender of last resort,
central banks can have a similar impact, as demon-
strated by Rochet and Vives (2004).
However, as King (2010) argues, although in 2007
“everyone thought that the crisis was one of liquidity
… it quickly became clear that it was in fact a crisis of
solvency” (p. 8). The problem of insolvency was cre-
ated by excessive leverage and risk. According to Sinn
(2010), in 2006 the five largest American investment
banks had equity to asset ratios of between 3.2 per-
cent and 4.6 percent (based on European accounting
rules, these ratios would have been even lower). 
The implication of such low equity ratios is clear.
Suppose that the ratio is 4 percent. Then if the value
of the assets held by the bank falls by more than
4 percent, the bank would be technically bankrupt:
equity holders should be wiped out, and creditors
should share what is left. It is clear, then, that both the
risk of the bank’s assets and the proportion of its
assets that are financed by debt are crucial for solven-
cy. This is why regulatory requirements for the capital
ratio depend on risk-weighted assets: we discuss
below whether existing and proposed regulations and
taxes are sufficiently strict. 
Several factors may have been involved in creating the
situation in which banks held excessively risky assets,
given their equity capital. One, highlighted by Sinn
(2010) in the context of the present crisis and first
analyzed theoretically in Sinn (1980), is the misuse of
limited liability. We discuss this in the next subsection,
before considering other factors, including preferen-
tial taxation. 
5.2.1 Limited liability
In the presence of risky investment, limited liability
implies that the shareholders of a company gain from
risk on the upside, but that their losses on the down-
side are limited. When debtholders do not react to the
banks’ risk choices, limited liability creates the incen-
tive both for high leverage and high risk: both of these
improve the gamble available to shareholders. 
The importance of the response of the debtholders to
greater risk on the asset side is illustrated by a simple
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example in Appendix 5.A. The first part of the exam-
ple considers three companies, each undertaking an
investment of 100, financed by 20 of equity and 80 of
debt. The expected return on each of the investments
is 10 percent. The three companies differ in the risk of
that return: in particular there are two possible out-
comes for each company; in the bad outcome, the
total return may be less than the outstanding debt, in
which case the company defaults: the shareholders
receive nothing, and the debtholders also lose. 
Suppose debtholders are able to observe the strategy
of the company, and to hold the company to a strate-
gy after the lending has taken place. Suppose also that
there are no specific costs associated with bankruptcy.
In this case, debtholders will demand a rate of inter-
est that compensates them for greater risk. In particu-
lar, as the downside risk to creditors increases, the
interest rate charged will increase. Since shareholders
have to pay the higher interest rate in the good state,
it is straightforward to show that in this case there is
no incentive for shareholders to take on extra risk. 
This is demonstrated in a more complex differentiated
duopoly banking model by Matutes and Vives (2000)
or in a competitive banking model by Sinn (2003).2 In
subcases of these models, banks compete for deposits,
have limited liability, and choose the risk of their
investment, while taking into account that the interest
rate charged by the depositors depends on the risk
they choose. In these circumstances, for risk-averse
investors there is a disincentive to take on extra risk
and the choice of risk is optimal from a social pers-
pective. 
A similar argument holds with respect to increasing
leverage. A second example in the Appendix A com-
pares three companies with the same investment, but
with different leverage ratios. As before, if the rate of
interest charged by the debtholder accurately reflects
her own risk, then there is not a clear case for using
additional leverage. In fact, this is simply an example
of a fundamental, and possibly the most famous,
result of the theory of corporate finance – the theo-
rem of Modigliani-Miller (1958). This states that,
given certain conditions, the risk and value of a com-
pany does not depend on the way in which it is
financed: it depends only on the activities that the
firm undertakes. Given the company’s activities, a rise
in the use of debt and a commensurate decline in the
use of equity will increase the risk and required rate of
return of both the debt and the remaining equity. But
the overall cost of capital of the company will be
unaffected. 
So the existence of limited liability in itself does not
necessarily induce more risky behaviour, nor does it
necessarily induce more leverage. However, limited
liability does induce excessive risk taking when
debtholders or other market partners on whom the
actual liability would fall instead of the decision mak-
ers do not react to the bank’s risk choices. 
This is illustrated in Appendix 5.A. If, for example,
debtholders simply charge the risk-free rate of interest
irrespective of the risk taken by the company, then
shareholders have an incentive both to increase lever-
age and to increase the risk of the company’s invest-
ment. The reason is the combination of the fixed rate
of interest charged by debtholders and limited liabili-
ty for shareholders. For a given rate of interest, a
more risky strategy allows shareholders to gain more
on the upside, but not to lose any more on the down-
side. And this strategy can be more successful the
higher the proportion of the investment funds provid-
ed by the creditors. 
There are various reasons why this latter case of non-
reacting interest rates may be relevant in practice. One
is that the government bears the losses exceeding the
equity capital. This possibility has been analysed in
general risk theoretic models by Sinn (1980, 1982) and
in an explicit banking model by Dewatripont and
Tirole (1994). A second is that in a one-shot game,
bondholders are unable to enforce a particular risk
policy on the bank, as the lending contract is made
before the decision about the risk. This was analysed
by Matutes and Vives (2000) in a general banking
model. A third is that due to asymmetric information
which makes bank bonds and deposits lemon prod-
ucts whose risk-return characteristics are opaque,
debtholders cannot distinguish between safe and risky
banks and are therefore unable to charge the risky
banks higher interest rates. This possibility has been
analysed in general terms in Sinn (1980) and in an
explicit banking model by Sinn (2003). The lemon
interpretation in the context of the opaqueness of
derivatives trading is in the centre of Sinn’s interpre-
tation of the crisis (Sinn 2010).
These three reasons for why limited liability may
result in excessive risk-taking in principle apply to all
limited liability firms, and not only to banks.
2 In Sinn (1980) this borderline case was discussed in term of the
Coase theorem, before the discussion moved to asymmetric infor-
mation and bailout strategies. However, except for the second reason, they are more
relevant for banks than for normal firms. 
Unlike normal firms banks have a higher chance of
being bailed out by the government because they are
considered systemically relevant and “too big to fail”.
Ueda and Weder di Mauro (2010) have recently used
two approaches to estimate the impact of the “too big
to fail” subsidy for banks. Their estimates of the ben-
efits to banks are measured in terms of a funding cost
advantage, and range from 20 basis points to 65 basis
points.
Moreover, the asymmetric information case may be
particularly relevant for banks as the banking busi-
ness is extremely “opaque” due to the use of deriva-
tives, off-balance sheet operations and mutual CDS
insurance, as ex-Fed chairman Alan Greenspan has
argued. Normal firms that borrow from banks are
usually well observed by the banks’ risk officers, but
the banks themselves, which tend to receive their
funds from a dispersed group of individual house-
holds, do not face a similarly strong controlling power
among their creditors. 
The problem of asymmetric information was wors-
ened by what the governor of the Bank of England,
Mervyn King, called a “lapse into hubris”: 
“The real failure was a lapse into hubris – we came to
believe that the crises created by massive maturity
transformation were problems that no longer applied
to modern banking... There was an inability to see
through the veil of modern finance to the fact that the
balance sheets of too many banks were an accident
waiting to happen, with levels of leverage on a scale
that could not resist even the slightest tremor to con-
fidence about the uncertain value of bank assets”
(King 2010, p. 10).
In this view, the proliferation of financial instruments,
together with special investment vehicles, and other
factors documented at length elsewhere, simply got
out of hand, with buyers of financial instruments
having little idea of their underlying risk. Rating
agencies – either through deliberate policy determined
by their own incentive mechanisms or simply because
of miscalculation – were unable to offer appropriate
advice. 
In this case, the excessive leverage and risk taken by
banks was, at least in part, simply a mistake. This
would explain the relatively low rates of interest
charged by creditors, referred to above. If creditors
simply underestimated the risks that they were facing
and hence charged rates of interest that were too low,
this would create an incentive for banks to undertake
excessive leverage and risky lending.
5.2.2 Other factors
So one possible explanation for the excessive leverage
and risk of banks prior to the crisis is limited liability,
because limited liability means that the banks’ risk
choices involve negative externalities being imposed
on taxpayers or on banks’ debtholders. But what
about other explanations such as the role of managers
that follow their own agenda or the high cost of equi-
ty capital, which are often cited in the public debate?
The next two sections go into this. 
5.2.2.1 Agency problems
The argument that managers disregard the prefer-
ences of their shareholders and expose their banks to
excessive risks is often made in the public debate.
Bank executives, it is said, typically have incentive sys-
tems that make them participate asymmetrically in
upside and downside risks. In view of this asymmetry
they seek excessive risks that jeopardise the future of
the bank at the expense of shareholders and society.
This would be a problem even if there was no implic-
it government guarantees to creditors or the inability
of debtholders to punish risk-taking with higher
interest rates. 
While this argument sounds plausible at first glance,
the question remains why shareholders would give
their executives incentive schemes that imply excessive
risk-taking, if this is not in their own interest. 
As has been pointed out in Sinn (2010), a plausible
answer is simply that the shareholders give their exec-
utives asymmetric incentive schemes, because limited
liability provides the shareholders with such asym-
metric incentives. As the principals (the shareholders)
want their banks to gamble, they give their agents (the
executives) incentive schemes that turn them into
gamblers. Large bonuses in the case of success are
then simply an indication of the interests of share-
holders and executives being closely aligned. Thus, no
principal-agent theory is needed to understand why
there was excessive risk-taking and leverage prior to
the crisis.
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It is nevertheless striking to see how large the bonuses
awarded to executives really are. The annual payment
of bonuses in the City of London stretches into bil-
lions of pounds. As an example, the UK government
introduced a one-off tax of 50 percent on bonuses
paid by banks in 2009. This raised around 3.5 billion
pounds in tax revenue, implying that executives
received a further 3.5 billion pounds, the total cost to
banks stretching to 7 billion pounds. 
These are such enormous rewards to employees that it
is hardly conceivable that they reflect the true value to
society of their activities. Probably, the remuneration
of managers has elements of a remuneration of super-
stars. The marginal value of a superstar like a singer,
a football player or a racing driver can be huge for the
company hiring him or her, but this marginal value
may largely stem from depriving other participants in
the race from their profit and may therefore measure
more the advantage from rent-seeking than a true
social advantage. Thus, arguably, the executive prob-
lem is not that they choose more risks than their
shareholders want but that their remuneration is too
large, coming to a considerable extent from winning
zero sum games at the expense of slightly less sophis-
ticated private investors. 
5.2.2.2 Costs of equity finance
Banks typically argue that they leverage their operations
so extensively because equity finance is more expensive
than debt finance. The implication is that forcing banks
to hold more equity would raise their refinancing costs.
In turn this would raise the costs of their lending, prob-
ably forcing them to cut back on lending to other sec-
tors and hampering economic growth. 
There is a substantial economic literature in corporate
finance that investigates this issue in a general context,
rather than specifically for banks. In considering equi-
ty finance, it is necessary to distinguish two sources:
retained earnings and new equity issues. It is general-
ly accepted that by far the largest source of finance to
the corporate sector in developed economies is inter-
nal finance in the shape of retained earnings. Of
external finance, debt is used more heavily than new
equity.3 
There are many issues of agency and asymmetric
information involved in external finance. Kashyap et
al. (2010) usefully distinguish stock and flow concepts
of the costs of equity finance. Flow costs relate to
issuing new equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest-
ed that asymmetry of information between manage-
ment and external investors would lead to an issue of
new equity being interpreted as a negative signal by
outsiders, since if managers act in the interests of
existing shareholders, then they will sell shares when
they believe it to be overvalued. There is evidence that
share issues tend to be associated with negative share
price effects, compatible with this (for survey evidence
see, for example, Graham and Harvey 2001). As a
result, managers will be reluctant to use new equity
finance in the first place.
Another argument leading in the same direction
refers to the double taxation of dividends with cor-
porate and personal taxes that characterizes most
OECD tax systems. As was shown by King (1977) the
double taxation increases the cost of new share issues
over retained earnings and induces firms to prefer
internal finance.4 It is important to note, however,
that the relevant shareholders often reside outside the
country, in which case domestic personal tax rates are
not relevant.5
Due to higher costs of equity finance, it is argued that
a requirement to raise the capital ratio is more likely to
be met in the short-term by shrinking assets than by
issuing new equity, even when the assets represent
profitable investments. This is perhaps a caution
against demanding too rapid a change in capital ratios.
On the other hand, a regulation requiring additional
equity presents a reason for issuing new equity that is
clearly different from the Myers-Majluf argument.
Adhering to new regulation by issuing new equity
should reasonably not be viewed by the market as a
negative signal. However, to the extent that sharehold-
ers are liable to personal taxes on dividend payments,
the tax argument does suggest that some pressure may
be required that forces banks to satisfy additional
equity requirements with new issues of shares rather
than allow them to wait until enough equity capital
has been accumulated by mere profit retentions. 
In any case, the long-run costs of using equity finance
are much less clear, precisely since companies and
3 See Mayer (1988) and Tirole (2006). 
4 In fact, an extension of this argument implies that only new and
extremely rapidly growing firms would resort to lump-sum issues of
new shares, followed by an extended period where firms neither issue
new shares nor distribute dividends to grow with their maximum
speed until maturity (Sinn 1991).
5 For example, Bond, Devereux and Klemm (2006, 2007) show that
significant reforms to dividend taxation in the United Kingdom in
1997 had no discernible effects on investment, dividend payments or
share prices.banks can build up the stock of equity finance by
retained earnings.
Admati et al. (2010) and Hellwig (2010) consider var-
ious arguments that have been made to justify high
leverage in banks. These arguments include: increased
equity will increase funding costs since equity is more
risky; increased equity requirements will lower the
rate of return earned by banks; increased equity
would be costly since debt is necessary for providing
market discipline to managers; and increased equity
would force banks to cut back on lending. They argue
that there is little reason to fear such implications,
because they are not very likely and if they occur,
would be welfare enhancing, given that they would
result from an internalization of external losses
imposed on taxpayers and/or creditors. Haldane
(2010) demonstrates how leverage has significantly
increased over the last few years: current levels are by
no means the historic norm. 
5.2.3 Tax distortions
A further incentive for excessive use of debt finance is
the tax advantage of doing so. In addition, there is
arguably an advantage to the financial sector from
being exempt from VAT. 
5.2.3.1 Tax incentives for debt financing
It is generally the case that corporation taxes are
based on profits including interest receipts but net of
interest payments. For personal and institutional
shareholders of most companies, this deductibility of
interest payments creates an incentive to ask their
managers to finance the company’s activities through
debt rather than equity, because the shareholders’ tax
on interest income is less than the overall tax burden
on retained earnings consisting of the corporation
income tax and possibly a personal capital gains tax
on share appreciation. The same is true for the share-
holders of banks. For a given set of loans, there is
therefore an incentive for banks to finance their activ-
ities by debt rather than equity.
Such forms of corporation and personal taxation are
not new: in most countries they have been in place for
decades. If anything, there has been a move towards
lower taxes on personal interest income and higher
capital gains taxes, although these have been offset
also by reductions in corporation tax rates and
increasing restrictions on interest deductibility at the
corporate level to combat tax avoidance. Partly
because these forms of taxation have been in place in
most countries for some time, this factor is not gener-
ally considered to have been a decisive factor in the
lead-up to the crisis.6
Another reason for this judgement is that the defini-
tion of what is “debt” and “interest” tends to be dif-
ferent for tax purposes and regulation (see Devereux
and Gerritsen 2010). Some financial instruments may
be treated as part of equity capital for the purposes of
regulation but as debt for the purposes of tax. Hence
what is considered to be equity capital for regulatory
purposes may receive favourable tax treatment. This
implies that the favourable tax treatment of interest
may not induce banks to reduce regulatory capital
further.
5.2.3.2 Exemption from VAT 
The financial sector is generally exempt from VAT.
This means that VAT is not charged on outputs, and
VAT paid on inputs cannot be reclaimed. Relative to
normal VAT treatment, this implies a higher tax on
business-to-business transactions (where VAT at
earlier levels of production can be offset against
later levels), but a lower tax on business-to-con-
sumer transactions. Broadly, evidence suggests that
revenue is lower than would be the case under full
VAT treatment.7 As pointed out by the IMF (2010),
this could have contributed to the financial sector
becoming larger than would otherwise have been the
case. 
Exemption is generally used because of the difficul-
ties in identifying value added on margin-based
instruments (e.g. borrowing and lending with a
spread, but no explicit charge). There is a small opti-
mal tax literature asking whether financial interme-
diation, as an intermediate good, should be subject
to VAT. Lockwood (2010) suggests that in a simple
framework, intermediation services should not be
taxed, but that there could be a role for a Pigouvian
tax (unrelated to the systemic risk issues discussed
here). 
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Shackelford, Shaviro and Slemrod (2010). In Germany, however, the
tax reforms of the Schröder government strongly moved in this
direction by introducing a personal capital gains tax for the first time
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reforms may therefore have contributed to inducing the banks owned
by personal German shareholders to exploit more fully the scope for
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There is therefore the possibility that the financial sec-
tor has been under-taxed, and that it may have gained
a larger share of the economy as a result. However,
this case should not be overstated. 
5.2.4 Why did regulation fail?
Banks and other financial companies have not been
free to choose their own leverage and risk positions
for many years, but have been subject to regulations
especially in the Basel I and II agreements. It is clear
that these regulations failed to prevent the crisis.
Detailed accounts of why these regulations were
insufficient are provided elsewhere.8 We will not
repeat these at length. However, in assessing the
reform of these regulations and the possible role of
taxation as a replacement or complement to revised
regulations, it is useful to identify briefly why they
may have failed. The reader is also referred to the sec-
tion “The role of the Basel system” in Chapter 2.
Over 100 countries signed on to the Basel I agree-
ment, originally set up in 1988. This provided for a
minimum capital ratio. Tier 1 capital consists
broadly of paid-in capital, accumulated earnings
and preferred stock. Tier 2 includes a broader defi-
nition of capital, including subordinated debt.
Each of these measures is divided by a measure of
risk-weighted assets to create the minimum Tier 1
and Tier 2 capital requirements: 4 percent and
8 percent, respectively. 
Under Basel I, assets are assigned to broad risk
classes, and given weights for use in these ratios. For
example, loans to firms were normally given a weight
of 0.5, loans to normal banks a weight of 0.2, and
sovereign loans a weight of zero. The Basel II
accord, implemented in the European Union,
Switzerland and some other countries from 2008,
introduced a much more flexible system of assigning
weights to specific assets. Broadly, following lobby-
ing from the industry, banks were permitted to use
their own models to differentiate – in principle, more
precisely – the risks associated with different types of
lending. Among other things, this permitted banks
to hedge their lending with credit default swaps, and
replace the risk weight of the debtor with that of the
insurer. Overall, as Sinn (2010) demonstrates, the
result was that a Tier 1 ratio could easily be four or
five times larger than a simple equity asset ratio of
Tier 1 capital to total assets. For many banks, the
simple equity asset ratio was less than 2 percent
while they reported a Tier 1 ratio in the range of
8 percent or 10 percent. 
The problems of the system were exacerbated further
by the accounting treatment of mark-to-market,
which created procyclical effects. In an upswing, asset
prices rise, high profits are recorded which increase
Tier 1 capital, and vice versa. Consequently, there is
an incentive to reduce Tier 1 capital in an upswing,
making it more difficult to replace this capital in a
downswing. This effect is multiplied at lower equity
asset ratios. 
A further problem of the system was that significant
parts of the financial system were not subject to the
Basel regulations, in particular, hedge funds and spe-
cial purpose vehicles. The latter were vehicles typical-
ly set up in tax havens, and whose assets did not
appear on the balance sheet of the parent bank, even
though in practice the parent was obliged to assume
the risks of the special purpose vehicle.
This very brief review serves to highlight two factors:
the level and the definition of the required capital
ratio. Both factors require attention.
5.3 Tax versus regulation
Historically, policies to deal with negative externali-
ties arising in the financial system have taken the
form of regulation rather than taxes. However, since
the crisis there has been a growing interest in the
possibility of introducing new taxes on banks.9 The
motivation could be to induce less harmful behav-
iour and so reduce externalities, or to raise addition-
al revenue, or both. In this section we address the
basic principles involved in choosing between tax
and regulation as a means of reducing externalities.
We then briefly summarize recent policies either pro-
posed or already enacted by national and interna-
tional governments. 
5.3.1 Basic principles
There is clearly a case for policymakers to intervene in
a market which, left to itself, would generate harmful
externalities on the rest of society. The classic exam-
9 Recent theoretical contributions include Bianchi and Mendoza
(2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010) and Perotti and Suarez (2010).  8 See, for example, Sinn (2010) and Vives (2010a).ple of such a market is one that
creates pollution. But the need
for regulation of banking shows
that this is generally also thought
to be true in this case as well. In
considering intervention in such
markets, policymakers have two
possible tools, essentially affect-
ing prices or quantities. We can
translate this into taxes – affect-
ing prices – or regulation – affect-
ing quantities. Existing regula-
tion of banks through capital
requirements is a form of quanti-
ty control: banks are given a min-
imum capital requirement. A tax
would follow a different route: by
taxing or subsidizing alternative
forms of finance, policymakers may induce banks to
hold more capital. 
The current mainstream view amongst economists
about the relative merits of these two approaches
stems from a contribution by Weitzman (1974). For
example, Stern (2007) and Keen (2010) both apply
Weitzman’s model to externalities from carbon emis-
sions and from systemic risk in banking, respective-
ly. It is therefore worth briefly presenting this
approach before discussing its application in the case
of banking. 
The approach is illustrated in Figure 5.1, taken from
Keen (2010) though also used elsewhere. The upward-
sloping lines show the private marginal costs (PMC)
facing banks as the proportion of their funding in the
form of equity capital, k, rises. The downward-slop-
ing lines represent the marginal net external benefits
(MEB) of increasing k. The initial social optimum is
at k*, where the initial PMC line intersects with the
MEB line. In the absence of any regulation or taxa-
tion the bank would choose the capital ratio for which
the private marginal costs are zero.
Keen (2010) discusses the slopes of these lines in
terms of a failure externality and a bailout externality.
The failure externality reflects the probability of a
bank falling into distress or failure, and the wider
social costs if it does so. The greater is the sensitivity
of this failure externality to the capital ratio, the
steeper is the MEB line. The bailout externality
reflects the benefits to banks due to a lower interest
rate charged by creditors as a result of creditors
expecting to be bailed out in the event of default. A
larger bailout externality tends to flatten the PMC
line, since it blunts the sensitivity of the cost of rais-
ing finance to the capital ratio. 
With perfect information, a policymaker could ensure
that the social optimum k* is chosen in the market in
two ways. It could subsidise the bank by paying a
marginal subsidy of s to offset the banks private mar-
ginal costs. Or it could impose k* as a minimum cap-
ital requirement. 
However, now suppose that there is a change in the
private marginal cost line to PMC’. Alternatively
PMC’ might also be interpreted as the “true” private
marginal cost, known to the bank but not known to
the policymaker (who believes that this cost is repre-
sented by the original line, PMC).
Under a minimum capital requirement of k*, there is
no change in the capital used by the bank. Even at
PMC’, the bank would prefer a capital ratio of less
than k*, since at this point private marginal costs are
still positive. With a subsidy of s, however, the bank
would instead choose a capital ratio of k’, where the
combination of marginal cost and subsidy remains
zero. 
Neither of these outcomes is optimal, since the opti-
mal position is at k**. Conventional analysis compares
the total welfare cost under each option. This depends
on the relative slopes of the PMC and MEB lines. The
position shown in the figure is that the distortion is
lower with the subsidy, reflecting the fact that the
PMC line is steeper than the MEB line. But this need
not generally be true.
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However, this analysis makes several implicit assump-
tions. Notably, as pointed out by Kaplow and Shavell
(2002), the analysis assumes a linear subsidy schedule:
that is, the marginal rate of subsidy is fixed.10 Suppose
instead that a non-linear schedule were possible. We
can expect the bank to take into account its private
costs, but not the net social benefits, of a higher capi-
tal ratio. Then the optimal position could be achieved
if the policymaker could set a marginal subsidy sched-
ule equal to the MEB schedule. In effect, this would
simply mean that the bank would fully incorporate
the MEB schedule into its decision making. 
In this case, the policymaker would not need to know
anything about private costs or benefits, but only to
estimate the MEB schedule, reflecting the net margin-
al costs to society. Of course, to the extent to which
the MEB schedule is measured with error, then the
marginal subsidy would also contain error, and the
outcome would not be efficient. But this would be the
case with any intervention. 
Although the analysis has been framed in terms of a
subsidy to be paid to banks, it is relatively straightfor-
ward to instead consider this in the form of a tax. The
MEB schedule has been drawn with positive values,
reflecting a reduction in the net social cost of an
increase in the capital ratio, k. A tax which falls as k
rises would therefore also be consistent with this
approach. Note, though, that such a tax would not
necessarily yield revenue equal to social costs. This is
because the tax would in principle be set to match the
marginal social costs, rather than the average social
costs. In general, since marginal costs are likely to fall
with k, then they will be lower than average costs. If
each bank faced a tax rate based on the marginal cost
of its capital ratio, it is therefore likely to be the case
that tax revenues would be lower than social costs.
Of course, both regulation and taxes face a problem in
translating such macroeconomic analysis into a policy
fit for individual banks. This is partly simply a scale
problem. For example, if all banks faced the same
non-linear schedule, it would be necessary to divide
the aggregate marginal external benefit between banks
to derive the appropriate schedule for each bank. A
similar problem exists for regulation. A more difficult
problem is heterogeneity between banks: a bank which
creates more systemic risk at the margin should in
principle be taxed at a higher rate. But it is very diffi-
cult to implement a tax in which each bank faces a dif-
ferent tax rate. Dealing with differences between banks
is perhaps less difficult for regulation: although even
with regulation typically the same regulations apply to
all banks within a jurisdiction.11 
Finally, this theoretical analysis leaves aside the fact
that there is already a system of quantity regulation
in place, supported by over 100 countries who have
adopted the Basel system. By contrast, proposals
for addressing banking externalities through taxes
have barely been examined. Taking it as given that
some form of regulation will continue along the
lines of Basel III, as discussed below, a relevant
question is whether there is a role for taxation as a
correction mechanism as well as regulation. We dis-
cuss this further below in the context of specific pro-
posals. 
5.3.2 Options for tax and regulation 
In this section we briefly summarise proposals for tax
and related proposals for regulation that have been
made, and already enacted, since the financial crisis
began. 
5.3.2.1 Tax
Taxes that have been proposed by national and inter-
national governments are summarized in Box 5.1.
5.3.2.2 Regulation
Several areas of regulation have been addressed in
response to the financial crisis. Here we focus only on
changes to capital and liquidity requirements, pro-
posed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS) as part of the Basel III frame-
work. We therefore leave aside issues relating to the
split of financial companies between retail and invest-
ment banking, reducing the size of financial compa-
nies to prevent them from being too big to fail and the
design of resolution mechanisms.12 All of these issues
are important. However, we focus on capital and liq-
10 Weisbach (2010) also points out that this analysis assumes that
policymakers are not able to change the rate of subsidy, or required
level of k, in response to new information. 
11 The Financial Securities Contribution (FSC) proposed by the IMF
is a tax on liabilities. Imposed at a single rate on the value of liabili-
ties, this would be a linear tax, and subject to the Weitzman analysis
above. The IMF does consider the possibility that the rate could
reflect the systemic risk of each bank but does not appear to consid-
er a non-linear schedule.
12 Important proposals for regulation of these factors are contained
in European Commission (2010b) and Dodd-Frank Act (2010).uidity requirements because it is in these areas that
there is a need to analyse the interaction and choice
between taxes and regulation. 
The Basel III framework, setting new controls on cap-
ital and on liquidity, was announced in September
2010. The minimum limits for “capital” as a percent-
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Box 5.1 
Alternative forms of taxation
We describe four alternative forms of taxation on banks. This discussion draws on the IMF (2010), and also
identifies cases where such taxes have been proposed or enacted.
Financial Securities Contribution (FSC)  
Various forms of a tax, or levy, on the liabilities of financial companies have been proposed. The version 
considered by the IMF (2010) would be paid by all financial institutions, and would initially be levied at a flat
rate on a broad measure of the institution’s liabilities or assets, excluding capital (Tier 1 for banks), and with a
credit in respect of insured liabilities, such as deposits.
This is similar to the Financial Responsibility Fee (FRE) proposed by the United States. This was originally
envisaged as a charge of 15 basis points on the liabilities, less Tier 1 capital and insured deposits, of large 
financial institutions. However, more recent proposals have envisaged it being based on risk-weighted assets.
Sweden has introduced a similar stability fee on liabilities of banks at a rate that will rise to 3.6 basis points. The
United Kingdom will also introduce a levy, based explicitly on the IMF proposals from 2011. It was originally
planned to have a rate of 7 basis points on a broad definition of liabilities. However, the United Kingdom has set
a target of raising 2.5 billion pounds in revenue, and plans to adjust the rate to meet this target. France and 
Germany have also announced their intention to introduce a similar levy.
The motivation for the levy differs. The IMF proposed that it be linked to a resolution mechanism, and that the
levy would be intended to pay for any future government support for the sector. In Sweden, the fee is intended to
accumulate around 2.5 percent of GDP in a resolution fund. The original US proposal was intended to recover 
costs already incurred in the crisis. Originally, the UK proposal was “designed to encourage less risky funding 
and complements the wider agenda to improve regulatory standards and enhance financial stability” (Hoban
2010), but the UK government has more recently emphasised its role as raising revenue. Germany intends to set
the rate to reflect systemic risk, and earmark the proceeds for a resolution fund.
Financial Activities Tax (FAT)
The IMF also considered various forms of a Financial Activities Tax. One possibility is to base the tax on profits 
and all remuneration of financial institutions. If all remuneration is included in the tax base, then the base would
effectively be value added, and so could be seen as a substitute for VAT, which is not generally applied to
financial activities. However, if the profit element is appropriately designed, and if the remuneration element is
restricted to higher levels of remuneration, it could approximate a tax on economic rents earned in the financial
sector, given that part of the rent is captured by high-earning executives.
Tax on bonuses
The United Kingdom introduced a temporary tax on bonuses in the financial sector from December 2009 to April
2010 at 50 percent of bonuses above 25,000 pounds. France introduced a temporary bonus tax for the accounting
year 2009 at 50 percent of bonuses over 27,500 euros. A tax on bonuses is more difficult to implement on a 
permanent basis since it would be necessary to identify the proportion of total remuneration which is deemed to
be a bonus. Nevertheless, Italy introduced a permanent tax of 10 percent on bonuses and stock options exceeding
three times manager’s fixed remunerations, from 1 January 2010.
Financial Transactions Tax (FTT)
Popular debate has favoured a financial transactions tax (which has also become known as the “Robin Hood”
tax). Many countries already have some form of financial transactions tax. Advocates argue that such a tax could
raise substantial revenues from taxing speculative flows that have little social value, and may serve to reduce the 
incentive to create a cascade of structured securities that were at the heart of the financial crisis. However, the tax
would be a relatively blunt instrument for correcting socially costly financial behaviour as it would not be able to
distinguish between desirable and undesirable trading. It would not target the key sources of systemic risk, such
as the size and interconnectedness of banks. And its burden is likely to fall on the consumers of financial products
in the form of lower returns to savings and higher borrowing costs. A comprehensive survey of the case for and
against an FTT is provided by Matheson (2010).EEAG Report 2011 157
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age of risk-weighted assets or the size of the balance
sheet, which come into effect by 2019, are shown in
Table 5.1.
The counter-cyclical buffer range is intended to be
left to national authorities. Also, BCBS announced
that “systemically important banks” should have
loss-absorbing capacity beyond these standards. The
minimum capital asset ratio of 3 percent, which cor-
responds to a maximum leverage ratio of 33, is new.
It avoids the problem of risk-weighting the banks’
assets at the cost of not distinguishing between their
risk. Its effect is discussed further below. The 3 per-
cent ratio will be tested over a period that begins in
2013.
Note too that countries are able to impose much
stricter requirements. For example, Switzerland
requires UBS and Credit Suisse to hold total capital
equal to 19 percent of their risk-adjusted assets. Nine
percentage points is allowed to be held in the form of
contingent convertible capital instruments (cocos),
which are bonds that convert to equity if a bank’s cap-
ital ratio falls below a predetermined level.
The Basel III proposals contain two new minimum
liquidity requirements, designed to enhance both the
ability of banks to repay their liabilities as they fall
due and the maturity matching of banks’ balance
sheets. There is a particular emphasis on moving
banks away from relying too heavily on short-term
wholesale funding:
• Liquidity coverage – banks must hold sufficient
high quality liquid assets (cash, government bonds,
covered bonds and highly rated corporate bonds)
to enable them to withstand for 30 days the loss of
a proportion of their retail deposits and an inabil-
ity to roll over any corporate and wholesale
deposits.
• Net stable funding – banks must hold sufficient
stable sources of funding to match their lending of
over one year maturity.
In the European Union, these proposals are expected
to be implemented through the Commission’s Capital
Requirements Directive. As with capital, national reg-
ulators may set additional standards. For example, the
United Kingdom has already implemented new liq-
uidity arrangements which are, in many respects,
more restrictive than those proposed by the BCBS
and are likely to remain so.
Both the BCBS and national regulators have also
emphasised the importance of the boards of banks’
understanding liquidity risk, taking a close interest in
setting a risk appetite, and satisfying themselves that
these risks are properly monitored and controlled; the
need for banks to run a range of stress tests, covering
both bank-specific and market-wide vulnerabilities;
and for banks to have adequate systems, data, report-
ing and management information to enable continu-
ous management of liquidity. 
Basel III is an improvement over Basel II insofar as it
requires substantially more equity. The leverage ratio in
particular will change banks’ behaviour insofar as they
now for the first time need to hold equity against gov-
ernment bonds, which are not included in the sum of
risk-weighted assets to which the Tier 1 ratio refers.
Nevertheless, a minimum of the capital asset ratio of 3
percent is not yet sufficient as a bank’s losses could eas-
ily exceed 3 percent of its balance sheet. For example, in
the present crisis, the write-off losses of internationally
relevant financial institutions such as Wachovia,
Washington Mutual, Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac
ranged between 13 percent and 16 percent of the respec-
tive balance sheets.13 The failure of these banks would
not have been prevented with the Basel III regulation. 
There is moreover the problem
that even the tightest equity 
regulation will fail to establish
more prudence in the banking
business if the government sees
itself forced to bail out a bank
when its equity falls below the
regulatory minimum because the
bank would otherwise have to be
shut down by the regulator (the
Table 5.1
Basel III capital requirements from year 2019
Common equity Tier 1 capital Total capital
Capital-asset ratio*   3.0 
Percentage of risk-weighted assets
Minimum 4.5  6.0  8.0 
Plus conservation 
buffer 7.0  8.5  10.5 
Counter cyclical
buffer range 0–2.5 
Basel II  4.0 8.0 
* inverse leverage ratio.
Source: BCBS (2010a).
13 See Sinn (2010), Chapter 8, Table 8.1.regulation paradox). As we argue in Chapter 2, the
problem could be removed by bailing out the endan-
gered banks not with gifts but with fresh equity in
exchange for company shares. Providing new equity in
exchange for shares makes the regulatory equity of
the bank liable without having to shut down the bank;
it is a method to save the bank without saving its
shareholders. It induces the shareholders to opt for
cautious business models that reduce the risk of gam-
bling at the expense of the taxpayers. 
To be able to recapitalise banks, a fund could be set up
that holds enough capital for this purpose. The gov-
ernment could force banks to set up this fund with an
appropriate levy, or it could impose a tax on the bank-
ing business such as will be discussed in the next sec-
tion. 
5.4 Taxation to raise revenue
The rationale for raising additional tax revenue from
banks and other financial companies can be back-
ward-looking or forward-looking. 
As noted in the Introduction, the original US propos-
als for a “Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee” were
explicitly related to paying for the bailout costs of the
crisis through the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP). Laeven and Valencia (2010) provide some
evidence on the costs of bailouts to date. As might be
expected, these vary considerably between crises and
between countries. They also vary depending on what
is included in the costs. For example, with respect to
the financial crisis of 2007–8, Laeven and Valencia
estimate that the direct fiscal costs were on average
around 5 percent of GDP. In advanced economies, by
the end of 2009, the IMF (2010) suggests that the cost
of direct support had amounted to only 2.8 percent of
GDP. But Laeven and Valencia point out that the
crises led to output losses of 25 percent of GDP, and
a consequent increase in public debt of around 24 per-
cent of GDP. How large a tax is needed to cover costs
therefore depends critically on exactly what costs are
to be covered.
The aim of reimbursing past costs deserves some
comments. First, the effective incidence of taxes levied
on banks now may not match the effective incidence
of prior bailout payments. The implication of
President Obama’s remarks, cited above, is that indi-
viduals that benefited from the US bailouts should be
those who repay that money in the form of higher
taxes. But it is not enough to say, for example, that
bank A received bailout funds, and therefore that
bank A should face a tax payment now. First, this is
because the benefits of the bailout were shared wide-
ly across the economy. Indeed, the point of the
bailout was not to protect individual banks but to
protect the entire financial system, and beyond that,
the entire economy. To that extent, virtually everyone
in the economy must have benefited from bailouts. 
Second, even from a narrower perspective, it cannot
be the bank that ultimately bears the tax burden, but
individuals associated with the bank – its sharehold-
ers, employees, suppliers and customers. Which of
these individuals ultimately bears the tax burden
depends on the type of tax levied, and the conditions
in the various markets in which the bank operates.
What is far from clear, however, is whether any tax
levied post-crisis will be borne by the individuals who
profited from the bailouts, or from the behaviour of
the bank before the bailout.
The instructions from the G20 to the IMF for consid-
ering taxes on banks were also based on raising rev-
enue, rather than influencing behaviour: the IMF was
charged to consider how the financial sector could
make a “fair and substantial contribution” to meeting
the costs associated with government interventions.
However, this was also interpreted by the IMF as a for-
ward-looking question: how could a tax or levy help
meet the costs of future crises? The IMF rightly argues
that the financial sector should pay for fiscal support
that it may receive in the future. It also points to the
need for an effective resolution mechanism in the event
that financial support is needed, and believes that
taxes could support regulation in addressing external-
ities arising in the financial sector. We discuss the last
point in the next section. Here we consider only the
scope of a tax on the financial sector that would be
necessary to support an effective resolution mecha-
nism. The size of the revenue necessary is open to
question, and is not directly addressed by the IMF. We
also leave that aside, though it seems reasonable that
revenues should build up over time to a fund that
amounts to at least several percent of GDP. 
In designing a tax to raise revenue there are two pos-
sible routes to consider, even leaving aside (as we do
here) the possibility of attempting to modify behav-
iour to reduce externalities. The first route would be
to attempt to design a tax or levy that is like an insur-
ance premium. The second route would be to attempt
to design a tax that is as non-distorting as possible. 
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Following the insurance premium route, the tax
should fall more heavily on banks and financial com-
panies that are more likely to require help from a res-
olution fund, and from those that are likely to require
more substantial funds if that event occurs. That is,
the tax should fall more heavily on companies that are
larger, more fragile, and more systemically connected
to the rest of the financial sector. 
A tax designed on this basis would go well beyond the
simple objective of raising revenue. By targeting com-
panies that are more likely to require financial sup-
port, the tax would in turn be likely to have significant
behavioural consequences. For example, Matutes and
Vives (2000) show how fair, risk-based, deposit insur-
ance induces banks to behave less aggressively when
the regulator observes the risk position of the bank.
This may have beneficial consequences but raises the
issue of the relationship with existing regulations. The
proposed tax that comes closest to this is the
Financial Securities Contribution (FSC); we discuss
this proposal in more detail in the next section. 
The alternative approach would be to design a tax
that would raise revenue from the financial sector as a
whole but would not seek to base the tax liability on
actuarially fair insurance premia. Other things being
equal, such a tax would not distort the behaviour of
the financial sector beyond what is required by regu-
lation. The most obvious way to achieve this would be
a tax on economic rent. 
This could be implemented in several ways, but per-
haps the most straightforward would be something
comparable to existing corporation taxes but which
also gives relief for the opportunity cost of equity
finance, known as an “allowance for corporate equi-
ty”, or ACE (IFS 1991). This has been proposed in
the literature as a replacement for existing tax systems
on the grounds that it is neutral with respect to the
financing decision (since debt and equity receive
equivalent treatment) and the scale of investment (the
effective marginal tax rate is zero, since it is a tax only
on economic rent). 
Note that such a tax could be implemented in addi-
tion to conventional, existing corporation taxes. The
effect would be that the total marginal tax rate on eco-
nomic rent would be equal to the sum of the rates of
the two taxes, while a lower rate (from existing taxes)
would be applied to other capital income. This would
not remove the tax advantage to debt finance, but the
new tax would not exacerbate that problem. An alter-
native would be to use such a tax to replace existing
corporation taxes. However, in this case raising rev-
enue in excess of what is already raised would require
a very high rate, since it would be applied to a nar-
rower tax base. 
The IMF instead has proposed a series of taxes that
they call a “Financial Activities Tax” (FAT) (see
Keen, Krelove and Norregard 2010, for a discussion).
At one extreme, this would be approximately the same
as a corporation tax with an ACE allowance, plus a
tax on very high remuneration. This could also be
considered as a tax on economic rent, to the extent
that part of the economic rent of the company is cap-
tured by the management in the form of high remu-
neration. 
At the other extreme, the IMF proposes a tax on eco-
nomic rent plus all remuneration, rather than just high
remuneration. They point out that this tax base is
equivalent to value added, and consider whether it
would be appropriate as a tax on the financial sector in
place of VAT (which is not generally applied to the out-
put of financial services). There is a reasonable case to
be made for raising additional revenue in the form of a
tax on value added. However, there are important tech-
nical details about how it could be implemented that
remain as yet unresolved. The key issue is one of cas-
cading: in the VAT system, VAT paid on inputs can be
offset against VAT charged on outputs, which has the
net effect that VAT ends up as a tax on sales to the final
consumer. But there is no mechanism as yet for intro-
ducing something similar for the FAT, which may mean
that there are several levels of tax.
Nevertheless, some form of the FAT is a promising
way of raising additional tax revenue from the finan-
cial sector in a way which should generate relatively
small distortions. The choice between a narrower tax
base focussed on economic rent, and a broader tax
base equivalent to value added, depends to some
extent on the need for revenue and the consequent
rate at which the tax would be levied. For relatively
small tax revenues, the narrower tax base is attractive.
However, if larger revenues are needed, then the
implied tax rate required could be very high, and the
broader tax base would become more attractive.
5.5 Crisis prevention
In the previous section we have discussed the appro-
priate structure of taxes on the financial sector whenthe aim is to raise revenue either as a form of insur-
ance premium, or in a relatively non-distorting way.
We now turn to discuss the possibility that taxes may
be used as a way of deliberately influencing the behav-
iour of banks and other financial institutions, in par-
ticular to reduce the risk of a future financial crisis. A
key issue in considering any form of tax designed for
this purpose is its interaction with regulatory require-
ments. Starting with a blank sheet of paper, it might
be possible to design a tax that would make regulation
unnecessary; and we discuss this possibility briefly.
More realistically though, any new tax would sit
alongside existing and new regulations. It is therefore
important to consider the impact of such a tax condi-
tional on such regulations being in place. 
The main focus of this section is how taxes and regu-
lation can be used to address the solvency of financial
companies through capital requirements or taxes on
liabilities. However, this cannot be divorced from
other aspects of their behaviour. In particular, capital
and liquidity regulations and taxes need to be coordi-
nated, together with competition policy.14 
In the space available we do not aim to be compre-
hensive in discussing options for regulation and taxa-
tion. We therefore do not consider issues of competi-
tion; we do not discuss whether investment banking
should be split from retail banking, or whether banks
should simply be reduced in size. While these are
important regulatory issues, they are less relevant for
taxation, and we therefore leave them to one side.15
5.5.1 Capital adequacy
As described above, there have been considerable
recent developments in regulations for capital ade-
quacy through the Basel III proposals. At the same
time, some of the taxes proposed in response to the
financial crisis have also been designed to target the
amount of capital held by banks. In this section we
address two main issues. First, we consider the likely
effects of a tax on financial liabilities, along the lines
of the Financial Services Contribution (FSC) pro-
posed by the IMF, on the financing and lending
activities of banks. Second, we summarise evidence
on the case for more stringent capital requirements
or taxes. 
5.5.1.1 Taxes in the presence of regulation
If taxation is to be used as an element of crisis pre-
vention, then its precise design is important. To illus-
trate this, consider the FSC, as proposed by the IMF,
a form of which has been enacted in Sweden and the
United Kingdom. The IMF proposes a levy based on
“a broad balance sheet base on the liabilities side,
excluding capital ... and possibly including off-bal-
ance sheet items, and with a credit for payments in
respect of insured liabilities” (IMF 2010a, p. 13). 
The IMF proposes this base after considering a levy
based on risk-weighted assets. It rejects the former on
the grounds that such a levy could duplicate the
effects of Basel regulations also targeted at risk on the
asset side. This illustrates the problem of attempting
to use two instruments. If the tax and the regulation
are perfectly in alignment, then it seems likely that the
tax would have no effect on behaviour beyond what is
required by regulation. But if they are not in perfect
alignment, then the form of their interaction could be
important. 
To prepare for this discussion let us first study the
interaction between a regulation based on the Tier 1
capital ratio and one which is in addition based on the
capital asset ratio as in the Basel III system. Consider
Figure 5.2. The vertical axis shows a bank’s sum of
risk weighted assets relative to total assets, R, and the
horizontal axis the capital ratio, i.e. the ratio of Tier 1
capital to total assets (the inverse leverage ratio), k.
The upward sloping line marked Basel II reflects the
trade-off permitted in the Basel II regulations
between capital and risk-weighted assets. The inverse
of the slope of this line is the Tier 1 ratio, i.e. the ratio
of capital and risk-weighted assets. That is, a bank
that increased the risk of its assets as measured in the
Basel system would be required also to hold more
capital. The line therefore represents a locus of points
that are just acceptable to the regulator. We assume,
based on experience and the theoretical explanations
for the incentive to gamble under limited liability, that
banks would prefer a combination of lower capital
and more risk: that is, they would prefer to be located
towards the top left part of the diagram. However,
given regulation, the bank is forced to choose a
desired position either on the Basel II locus, or to the
right of the locus. 
Let us assume that the bank chooses the point (R1,
k1). In practice, banks may choose to hold a buffer of
additional capital to ensure that they do not easily
EEAG Report 2011 160
Chapter 5
14 Vives (2010b) shows how liquidity and solvency requirements are
substitutable and how they may depend also on the strength of com-
petition.
15 Vives (2010a) discusses at length the relationship between compe-
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cross the threshold due to small movements in asset
values; however, we neglect that possibility here.
The increase of the minimum Tier 1 ratio according
to Basel III pivots the locus to the right in a clock-
wise fashion, keeping the origin fixed, because more
Tier 1 capital is needed relative to total assets for any
given share of risk-weighted assets in total assets. In
the absence of further effects, let us suppose that
given the new regulations, the bank moves to the
point (R2, k2).
However, as noted above, the Basel III regulations
also introduce a minimum constraint to the capital
asset ratio. In the Figure, let us assume that this con-
straint is binding, at k3 with k3>k2. In effect, at the
minimum capital asset ratio the maximum share of
risk-weighted assets is R3; above this level, the Tier 1
ratio, as given by the Basel III line, becomes binding.
As shown in the figure, as long as the bank continues
to prefer to hold less capital and engage in more risky
lending, then the effect of the leverage ratio will be
likely to shift the bank from (R2, k2) not to (R2, k3)b u t
to (R3, k3). This is still on the locus of acceptable
points under the Basel III line. But it does not repre-
sent a safer combination of capital and risk as mea-
sured by the Tier 1 ratio: rather, since it lies on the
Basel III line, these two points represent an equally
acceptable trade-off between risk, as ordinarily mea-
sured, and capital. 
This may seem to imply that the minimum capital
ratio does not serve any useful purpose. However, the
rationale for the minimum capital asset ratio in Basel
III is that there are important deficiencies in the Basel
system of risk measurement. As
noted above, loans to companies
normally have a weight of 0.5,
loans to banks have a weight of
0.2, and loans to governments
are not counted at all. The finan-
cial crisis in general and the sov-
ereign debt crisis in particular
have shown how distorted the
idea of measuring risk by look-
ing at risk-weighted assets actual-
ly is. What seemed as a reason-
able concept, in practice has
turned out to be a recipe for dis-
aster (see Chapter 2).
The leverage constraint in terms
of the minimum capital asset
ratio, k3 in Figure 5.2, was intro-
duced to constrain the assets not included in the con-
cept of risk-weighted assets. If the availability of equi-
ty capital is fixed, then a bank has to scale down its
balance sheet to meet the higher required capital asset
ratio. Doing so by reducing assets not included in the
sum of risk-weighted assets, such as the lending to
governments, would also raise the average risk of the
remaining assets, and help the bank move towards
(R3, k3). But it would reduce the overall risk, as the
volume of assets such as government bonds, which
are risky but not included in the sum of risk-weighted
assets, is smaller at k3 than at k2. Thus, even though
the minimum capital requirement does not change the
measured risk relative to capital, it does reduce the
non-measured risk relative to capital, which could
mean lower externalities being imposed on the bank’s
creditors and on taxpayers. 
In addition to the leverage constraint, improvements
in the calculation of the sum of risk-weighted assets
seem advisable, given that the risk weights have been
chosen arbitrarily, reflecting lobbying power more
than basic economic rationale. A re-adjustment of
these weights seems highly advisable. Such a reform
should ensure that the sum of risk-weighted assets
across all banks of a country equals or approximates
the sum of all assets; this would avoid the Tier 1 ratio
being four to six times as large as the capital asset
ratio (Sinn 2010, Chapters 7 and 8). Some economists,
such as Hellwig, find such endeavours futile as lobby-
ists will always undermine the effort of re-adjusting
risk weights so as to truly reflect risky lending opera-
tions (Hellwig 2010). They therefore suggest giving up
the idea of risk-weighting assets entirely and basing
the regulation only on the leverage ratio. 














Figure 5.2Consider now the role of the FSC suggested by the
IMF, i.e. basically a tax on a bank’s balance sheet, net
of its capital and augmented by off-shore operations.
Suppose we begin at point (R3, k3) and introduce the
FSC. One possibility is that the new levy would have
no effect: the bank would simply accept the addition-
al cost, but that cost would not be sufficient to induce
it to increase k. 
The other possibility is that the levy is sufficiently
high so that the bank chooses to hold more capital
than is required by the Basel regulations. As shown in
the figure, this could move the bank to (R3, k’).
However, once again, if the bank prefers more risk in
the sense of risk-weighted assets, then it can move
back onto the Tier 1 Basel III locus by investing in
riskier assets, to reach (R’, k’). 
This change therefore has exactly the same effects as
that induced by the introduction of the minimum cap-
ital ratio. Given equity capital, assets not included in
the sum of risk-weighted assets are reduced, raising
measured risk to total assets, but to the extent that the
released assets have some risk, the ratio of risk to
equity is lower. 
The beneficiaries of such a tax would be firms of the
real economy because their credits have the highest
weights in the sum of risk-weighted assets, and gov-
ernments will suffer, because their credit is part of the
non-measured risk that is reduced by the tax. Lower
lending rates for firms and higher ones for govern-
ments will result. Given the distortions that the finan-
cial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis have demon-
strated, this would likely contribute to a more solid
growth process of the Western world in the future. 
5.5.1.2 Empirical evidence to guide regulation
or taxation
Irrespective of the choice of policy instrument, to
implement appropriate policy it is necessary to esti-
mate the marginal costs and benefits of banks having
higher capital. Not surprisingly, social benefits and
costs are hard to measure, and estimates differ con-
siderably, at least in part because of the assumptions
made in the analysis. In this section we briefly review
existing estimates, attempting to make them compara-
ble with each other. In particular, we compare esti-
mates made by the BCBS (2010b), the Bank of
England (2010), Kashyap et al. (2010) and Miles
(2010). 
First, consider the benefits of raising the capital
ratio. Table 5.2 presents estimates derived from the
BCBS (2010b). The BCBS (2010b) estimates the ben-
efits of raising the capital ratio for one year as the
reduction in the probability of a crisis during that
year multiplied by the costs of a crisis if it occurs.
They specify estimates of the probability of a crisis
relative to the ratio of total capital employed to risk-
weighted assets. 
The BCBS (2010b) estimates the probability of a
crisis at 7.2 percent at a capital ratio of 6, falling to
4.6 percent at a ratio of 7 percent, and continuing to
fall to 1 percent at a ratio of 11 percent, with fur-
ther, though smaller falls after that. The estimates
shown in the second column of the Table represent
the marginal effects of increasing the capital to risk-
weighted assets ratio by 1 percentage point. Thus,
for example, increasing the ratio from 6 percent to
7 percent reduces the probability of a crisis by
2.6 percentage points. This gain rapidly diminishes
as the ratio rises.
The costs of a crisis are particularly difficult to mea-
sure. Estimates depend in part on assumptions made
about the effects on the long-run steady-state: that is,
whether the output of the economy ever catches up to
the level it would have achieved in the absence of the
crisis. We do not present new estimates here but sim-
ply summarise those of the BCBS (2010b). Across all
estimates that it analysed, it found that the mean esti-
mate of the cost of a crisis was 106 percent of pre-cri-
sis GDP, with a median of 63 percent. In columns 3
and 4 of Table 5.2 we show the implied marginal ben-
efits of increasing the capital ratio as reduction in the
probability of a crisis multiplied by each of these esti-
mates of the cost of a crisis. The results are broadly in
line with those of the Bank of England (2010),
although their estimates are presented in a rather dif-
ferent way. The marginal benefit from increasing the
capital ratio by one percentage point can be as high as
2.76 percent of GDP, although much smaller gains
are likely at relatively high capital ratios. Note though,
that these estimates are subject to considerable uncer-
tainty.
There is a wide dispersion in estimates of the cost of
raising the capital ratio. Columns 5 and 6 present esti-
mates of the marginal costs as estimated by the BCBS
(2010b) and the Bank of England (2010). Although
these estimates are very similar, there are significant
differences in how they are computed. In each case,
the estimate is based on the assumption that any rise
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in the cost of finance to banks from a higher capital
ratio would be passed on to borrowers, leaving the
return earned by the bank unchanged. The BCBS
(2010b) estimates that an additional 1 percentage
point in the capital ratio would raise the bank’s lend-
ing rate by around 13 basis points, and on their cen-
tral estimate, this translates into a consequent reduc-
tion in output of 0.09 percent. The Bank of England
(2010) estimates that the change would raise the lend-
ing rate by only 7 basis points, but that this would
reduce output by 0.1 percent.
Crucially, both of these estimates assume that the
rates of return to the bank’s capital owners and cred-
itors are unchanged by changing the capital ratio. As
discussed above, however, it seems implausible that
there should be no change in these rates of return.
These estimates should therefore be interpreted as an
upper bound. 
Further, both estimates take into account the higher
tax that will be due because of a reduction in interest
payments as the bank replaces debt with equity capi-
tal. We have argued above that the deductibility of
interest in combination with different effective tax
burdens on retained earnings and interest income of
shareholders represents a tax-induced distortion to
capital markets, generating an incentive to lower the
capital ratio. It does not therefore seem reasonable to
treat a reduction in this tax advantage as part of the
social cost of reducing bank borrowing. 
Two other studies attempt to correct for both of these
factors. Kashyap et al. (2010) first examine whether
there is evidence that the required return on equity
falls as the capital ratio rises, as predicted by theory.
They claim that their results “give us some empirical
support for using the Modigliani-Miller framework
as a basis of our calibrations, particularly for the pur-
poses of a long-run steady-state analysis”. Based on
the Modigliani-Miller approach, Kashyap et al.
(2010) consider two costs arising from raising the
capital ratio. One is the tax cost, discussed above.
They estimate that a 2 percentage point rise in the
capital ratio would increase the lending rate by
5 basis points due to taxation. However, we neglect
this in the table, on the grounds that this does not
represent a social cost. 
Kashyap et al. (2010) also consider other potential
costs. One is that additional equity capital might
replace short-term debt, which might be more likely in
the presence of additional liquidity requirements as
well as additional capital requirements. To the extent
to which short-term debt has a “money-like” conve-
nience factor, Kashyap et al. (2010) suggest an upper
bound on the premium would be 2 basis points for a
2 percentage point difference in the capital ratio. In
Table 5.2 we estimate the effect on output of this
change. To do so, we use an average of the estimates
from the BCBS (2010b) and the Bank of England
(2010) of the effect of a 1 basis point change in the
lending rate on output. This translates into a margin-
al reduction in GDP of 0.01 percent. 
Finally, Miles (2010) undertakes a similar exercise,
using the Bank of England study as a starting point.
He too abstracts from the tax effect, and makes a par-
tial adjustment for the required rate of return on equi-
ty. He also makes two other adjustments. The result is
that he finds the estimated cost is less than 10 percent
of that shown in Bank of England (2010). Translating
his approach into a comparable cost in our table, we
estimate the implied marginal cost to be well under
0.01 percent of GDP. This is shown in the last column
of Table 5.2.
While all of the estimates in the table are subject to
very large uncertainty, they can form the basis of a
rough guide to policy. In terms of a regulatory
requirement, the minimum capital ratio should be set
where marginal benefits are equal to marginal costs.
At the upper bound of estimates of costs, this would
imply a minimum capital ratio of around 13 percent
to 15 percent, depending on which estimate of the
marginal benefit is used. The Basel III requirements
currently peak at 13 percent if the ratio for total cap-
ital is used, plus the full extent of the counter-cyclical
buffer. The estimates in Table 5.2 suggest that this
should be considered to be a lower bound for the min-
imum capital requirement.
Allowing for some reduction in the required return on
equity capital, and abstracting from tax advantages,
the estimates indicate that marginal benefits clearly
exceed marginal costs even at a ratio of 15 percent.
This suggests that the optimal ratio could be signifi-
cantly in excess of 15 percent. Marginal benefits
above this are likely to be relatively small, but could
easily be as high as 0.1 percent of GDP for each addi-
tional percentage point of the capital ratio, though
they would decline as the ratio increased.
In principle, the estimates in Table 5.2 could be used
as the basis of a Pigouvian tax designed to induce
banks to choose the socially optimal capital ratio. Tobegin with, use the BCBS (2010b) estimate of the
probability of a crisis at a capital ratio of 7 percent
to be 4.6 percent. Evaluating the total expected net
cost at this probability based on the mean expected
cost of a crisis of 106 percent of GDP, and adjusting
for the effects on banks’ lending rates, yields a total
expected net social cost of just under 5 percent of
GDP. This is an indication of the size of the
Pigouvian tax that could in principle be levied on the
financial sector at this capital ratio. Based on the
same approach, the tax would fall to around 3 per-
cent of GDP at a capital ratio of 8 percent, then con-
tinue falling to be just under 1 percent of GDP at a
capital ratio of 11 percent. In sum, there is a case for
a very high Pigouvian tax at low capital ratios. But
as capital ratios fall, the optimal Pigouvian tax
would fall rapidly. 
5.5.2 Other issues
There are of course a number of actual and poten-
tial regulations that could be applied to the financial
sector. Given the aim of this chapter, we focus
briefly on just two related to taxation: liquidity and
bonuses. Section 5.2 of this chapter set out argu-
ments in some detail as to whether the financial cri-
sis was caused by either illiquidity of financial com-
panies or by agency problems in that bank execu-
tives were not necessarily acting in the interests of
shareholders. 
It is likely that the real problems causing the crisis
were of solvency rather than simply illiquidity.
However, even if this is true, then lack of liquidity in
the banking system could be an important factor in
driving another crisis. Perotti and Suarez (2009a, b)
argue that an excessive use of short-term financing
imposes an externality on the rest of the financial
sector by increasing the risk of fire sales, panics and
thus leading to strong crisis propagation mecha-
nisms. As set out above, the Basel III regime will
tighten liquidity requirements on banks. But reduc-
ing externalities associated with liquidity could in
principle also be achieved by a Pigouvian tax. Such
a tax has been proposed by Perotti and Suarez
(2009a, b), who suggest the introduction of a tax on
non-insured liabilities that increase the more liquid
the liability is. Very short-term debt financing, being
most prone to induce bank-runs, should be taxed the
most. Funding from capital and insured retail
deposits would, on the other hand, be exempt from
the tax. 
In principle, liquidity problems could be dealt with ex
post, by liquidity support from governments or cen-
tral banks. However, as clearly demonstrated during
the latest financial crises, it is very difficult to distin-
guish liquidity problems from insolvency. In such a
case, liquidity support is costly and creates substantial
moral hazard problems. Although, the idea to tax
short-term financing has a clear merit, it would be
necessary to analyse any detailed proposals for such a
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Table 5.2 
Comparison of benefits and costs of raising capital ratios
Implied marginal
benefit of increasing 
capital ratio, % of GDP
Estimated marginal cost of increasing capital ratio,





























7  2.6  2.76  1.64 0.09  0.1 0.011 0.006 
8  1.6  1.70  1.01 0.09  0.1 0.011 0.006 
9  1.1  1.17  0.69 0.09  0.1 0.011 0.006 
10  0.5  0.53  0.32 0.09  0.1 0.011 0.006 
11  0.4  0.42  0.25 0.09  0.1 0.011 0.006 
12  0.3  0.32  0.19 0.09  0.1 0.011 0.006 
13  0.2  0.21  0.13 0.09  0.1 0.011 0.006 
14  0.1  0.11  0.06 0.09  0.1 0.011 0.006 
15  0.1  0.11  0.06 0.09  0.1 0.011 0.006 
Sources: Columns 2–5, BCBS (2010b); Column 6, Bank of England (2010); Column 7, Kashyap et al. (2010);
Column 8, Miles (2010).EEAG Report 2011 165
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tax in the light of detailed proposals for liquidity reg-
ulation before judging it.
The extent to which the financial crisis was caused by
agency problems, leading bank executives to act in
their own interests, is open to question, since the
incentives of executives are reasonably closely aligned
with those of shareholders, and shareholders may
clearly benefit from excessive risk-taking due to the
miniscule liability the required capital ratios mean for
them. Nevertheless, as noted above, several countries
have implemented temporary or permanent taxes on
high bonuses paid to bank employees. 
We do not favour such taxes. The key reason is that
the proportion of an executive’s remuneration paid in
the form of a bonus can easily be changed. Indeed,
there are clear signs in the United Kingdom that the
basic remuneration of bank directors is increasing
rapidly, as bonuses are expected to decline. A tax on
bonuses is therefore likely to distort the incentive
package offered to executives. Arguably, this distor-
tion could be in a socially beneficial direction: if exec-
utives do not share in the upside gains, then their
incentive to undertake risky investment would be
diminished. But this could also have a wider effect on
the incentives to maximise profit. More generally,
high bonuses, and high profits, might reflect a lack of
competition in the financial sector. Rather than intro-
ducing new taxes on some of the symptoms of this
lack of competition, policymakers should consider
targeting the fundamental features of the sector that
reduce competitive pressures. Extremely high-pow-
ered bonuses may reflect shareholders’ incentives to
take excessive risk rather than an agency problem
within banks. Most likely, shareholders will find other
ways to induce their executives to gamble if bonuses
are taxed. 
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter analyses the case for introducing new
taxes in the financial sector. Any such taxes would
interact with, and possibly conflict with, existing reg-
ulations. The chapter therefore deals with both taxes
and regulations; it focuses primarily on those regula-
tions which are most closely related to taxation.
There are two broad objectives for introducing a tax
in the financial sector. The first is straightforward: to
raise revenue. This could be backward-looking – to
reimburse governments and society for the cost of the
last financial crisis – or forward-looking – to build a
resolution fund ready for the next crisis. Indeed we
have argued here and in Chapter 2 that such a fund,
which provides endangered banks with fresh equity
capital in exchange for shares, would be highly useful
to overcome the regulation paradox – that no required
equity level would prevent a crisis if the regulator
shuts down the bank once its equity falls under this
level. 
From a forward-looking, revenue-raising, perspective,
there are various options for the tax base. One is to
levy a form of insurance premium, where the tax
reflects the risk that an individual company will
require support from the resolution fund, and the
amount of support it would require. Such a tax would
be complex, however, and would almost certainly have
repercussions for the efficacy of regulation. 
Another option is a FAT, as recently proposed by the
IMF, which has two possible forms. In principle, we
would favour a narrow base, including economic rents
and remuneration of very highly paid employees
(which are also akin to economic rents). This would in
principle be non-distorting, but may require a rela-
tively high rate depending on the revenue require-
ments. This tax could be introduced alongside a con-
ventional corporation tax on profits net of interest
payments. If so, it would not correct the existing dis-
tortion in favour of debt finance, but it would also not
worsen it. In principle, the tax could also replace exist-
ing corporation taxes. This would be beneficial in that
the tax distortion in favour of debt finance would be
removed. However, the tax base would be relatively
narrow, and to raise the required revenue the implied
tax rate may need to be very high.
At the other extreme, another version of the FAT
would include all remuneration in the tax base. This
would be similar to a tax on value added, and could
be seen as a substitute for the lack of VAT in the
financial sector. It too could be introduced alongside
existing taxes. In this case there are a number of tech-
nical details about how the tax could be implemented
that remain to be resolved. 
A second objective of a new tax in the financial sector
could be to help make a future crisis less likely, by
inducing banks and other financial companies to
reduce leverage or to invest in less risky assets. One
option for this objective is the FSC proposed by the
IMF. Basically this is a tax on the bank’s balance sheetthat exempts the equity capital and insured assets but
includes off-balance sheet operations. Several coun-
tries have either introduced, or announced that they
plan to introduce, such tax. While this tax is partly
designed to raise revenue, it is also clearly intended to
reduce leverage. 
In principle, such a tax could be a meaningful addi-
tion to a Tier 1 capital regulation. It could induce a
higher ratio of capital relative to all assets including
government bonds, which are currently not included
in the sum of risk-weighted assets in the Basel system,
although the European debt crisis has demonstrated
how large the risks associated with such assets really
were. However, the FSC, like a minimum capital
requirement such as included in Basel III, is indepen-
dent of the risk of the bank’s assets. It is likely that a
bank would respond to a higher capital ratio –
induced either by the FSC or by the minimum capital
ratio – by increasing the risk of its assets, commensu-
rate with Tier 1 capital regulation. The benefit of
higher capital would therefore be undermined, at least
to some extent, by greater asset risk. After reacting to
the tax, the measured risk relative to the capital may
be as large as before. Nevertheless, an advantage will
remain to the extent that the non-measured risk,
including the risk associated with government bonds,
is reduced. 
In practice, such a tax would be implemented along-
side existing regulations. We review evidence on the
minimum capital requirements that are necessary to
equate marginal social costs and benefits. Based on
this evidence, the highest requirement under Basel III,
of 13 percent of risk-weighted assets should be seen
as a lower bound of what is socially optimal. It is like-
ly that additional social benefits would be achieved by
a higher ratio, though these benefits would probably
be small, relative to those achieved by raising the ratio
to 13 percent.
We propose that these requirements could also con-
tinue to be set by regulation, while we are more inse-
cure about the role of a tax. A minimum capital asset
ratio is a possibility, but the required ratio should be
substantially higher than 3 percent, given that in the
financial crisis the write-off losses of the entire US
banking system were 4.7 percent of the aggregate bal-
ance sheet and quite a number of prominent banks
had losses in the range of 14 to 16 percent of their
balance sheets.16
In sum, additional tax revenue would be useful in
establishing a crisis resolution fund. Options for taxa-
tion include taxes, such as the FAT, that are intended
to raise revenue in a relatively non-distorting way.
They also include taxes, such as the FSC, which are
intended to supplement regulation. The main case in
favour of the latter stems from an attempt to over-
come the deficiencies of existing regulation: its value
may therefore depend on whether it is instead possible
to reform the regulation directly. 
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Some simple corporate finance 
(a) How does limited liability affect the incentive to 
undertake risky projects?
Consider the following three companies, A, B and
C (see Table 5.A.1). Each company undertakes an
investment of 100, financed 80 by debt and 20 by
equity. In each case there are two equally probable
outcomes, good and bad. The expected return is
the same in all cases: 110. However, the risk differs.
Firm A has possible outcomes of 90 and 130; B of
70 and 150; and C of 50 and 170. The risk free rate
of interest is 5 percent.
(i) Risk neutrality
Suppose, to begin with, that both the creditors and
shareholders are risk neutral. This implies that the
creditor seeks a total expected return of 84.
For firm A, even the bad outcome yields more than
84, and so the creditor can charge the risk-free inter-
est rate of 5 percent, and receive 84 for certain. The
shareholder is left with 6 or 46, an expected return of
26. For firm B, in the bad state the firm goes bank-
rupt, and the creditor receives 70. To achieve an
expected return of 84, he must therefore charge an
interest rate, b, which earns 98 in the good outcome.
This is b = 22.5 percent. The shareholder receives zero
in the bad outcome, and 52 in the good outcome,
again an expected return of 26. The same happens for
firm C. In this case the creditor earns 50 in the bad
outcome, and must therefore earn 118 in the good
outcome, implying an interest rate of c = 47.5 percent.
The shareholder again receives zero in the bad out-
come, and 52 in the good outcome, with an expected
return of 26.
In this case, then, both creditors and shareholders are
indifferent between the three companies. This is not
surprising: both investors are risk neutral, and only
difference between the three companies is risk.
(ii) Risk aversion
Now suppose that the creditor is risk averse. Given
that the payoff to the creditor falls in the bad state
moving from firm A to B to C, the creditor will
require a higher expected rate of return. This implies
that the interest rate b will exceed 22.5 percent and the
interest rate c will exceed 47.5 percent. 
In turn, this implies that the shareholder faces a lower
expected return moving from A to B to C. That is, if
the creditor is risk-averse but receives a risk premium
such that she is indifferent between A, B and C, the
shareholder will prefer the firm with the less risky pro-
jects, even if she is risk neutral. She would have an
even stronger preference for the less risky projects if
she is also risk averse herself. 
(iii) Credit guarantee
Now suppose that the government guarantees a
bailout of the creditors, implying that they are guar-
anteed a return of 84 in the bad state in all firms.
Then the interest rate charged will be 5 percent in all
three cases.
In this case, the shareholder will receive 6 or 46 in case
A, 0 or 66 in case B, and 0 or 86 in case C. The expect-
ed return for the shareholder is thus higher the more
risky is the project the firm undertakes. 
The same incentives hold for shareholders condition-
al on having negotiated borrowing at a given rate of
interest. For example, there is an incentive for the
shareholder to borrow at 5 per-
cent to undertake A, but in fact
to use the funds to undertake B,
or even better, C. That is, for a
given borrowing and a fixed
interest rate, the shareholder has
an incentive to take on more risky
projects.
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Table 5.A.1 
Returns – constant capital ratios






Company A 100  90  130 
Shareholder A 20  6  46 
Creditor A 80 84 84 
Company B  100  70  150 
Shareholder B  20  0  150-80(1+b) 
Creditor B  80 70  80(1+b) 
Company C  100  50  170 
Shareholder C  20  0  170-80(1+c) 
Creditor C  80 50  80(1+c) EEAG Report 2011 169
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(b) How does the required return on
debt and equity vary with the pro-
portion of the firm financed by debt?
(i) Risk neutrality
Now consider the firm under-
taking project B, but allow the
proportion of debt to vary from
60 to 80 to 100 under the as-
sumption of risk-neutrality (see
Table 5.A.2). 
We have already analysed the
second case: a risk-neutral
debtholder would charge an
interest rate of 22.5 percent.
Where the company is complete-
ly debt financed, a risk-neutral
debtholder would charge an
interest rate of k = 40 percent.
This would yield 140 in the good
state, with an expected return of
105. When the debtholder invests
only 60, then the project is safe
from the debtholder’s perspec-
tive, and the interest rate charged
is 5 percent.
The returns to the shareholder
are shown in Table 5.A.3.
In this example, there is no clear incentive for the share-
holder to use more or less debt.  In the case of 100 per-
cent debt financing, the shareholder receives a return of
10 in the good state and nothing otherwise.
Suppose the firm only borrows 80, requiring the share-
holder to pay 20. Under the key assumption that the
shareholder can borrow under the same conditions as
the firm, she could simply borrow the 20 and promise
to pay back 0 if the bad state happens and 42 other-
wise, giving the required expected return of 5 percent to
lenders. Clearly, the shareholder then gets exactly the
same cash flows as with full debt financing. The same
is true for any other level of debt financing. 
More generally, the Modigliani-Miller theorem states
that in a world of full information, with no bankrupt-
cy costs, other agency costs or taxes and where share-
holders have access to the same borrowing opportuni-
ties as the firms, then the value of the company is
independent of leverage, while the required rates of
return on debt and equity adjust to compensate for
different risk associated with different capital struc-
tures (Modigliani and Miller 1958). 
(ii) Credit guarantee
However, now consider again the case in which the
government guarantees the return to the creditor of
the firm. If the firm goes bankrupt, the government
pays what is required to make the return to creditors
equal to 5 percent. No risk premium to be paid in the
good state is then required. In this case, the returns to
the shareholder are shown in Table 5.A.4.
Compared to the previous case, there is a clear advan-
tage to reducing the equity investment, i.e. using more
debt. That is, the outcome for the shareholder is the
same with an equity investment of 40. But it is better
than before with an equity investment less than 40, and
the improvement increases as the equity investment
falls. In the case of 20 percent equity financing, the extra
benefit to the shareholder is 14 in the good state and
zero in the bad with an expected value of 7. In the case
of full debt financing, the extra benefit is 35 in the good
state and zero in the bad with an expected value of 17.5.
Note that these amounts are equal to the expected cred-
it guarantee payments in the two cases. Since these pay-
ments increase in the share of debt financing, a credit
guarantee provides incentives to maximise leverage.
Table 5.A.2 







Company B  100 70  150 
Shareholder B  0  0  150-100(1+k) 
Creditor B 100  70  100(1+k) 
Company B  100 70  150 
Shareholder B  20  0  150-80(1+b) 
Creditor B  80  70  80(1+b) 
Company B  100 70  150 
Shareholder B  40  7  87 
Creditor B  60  63  63 
Table 5.A.3 
Shareholder returns – different capital ratios
Equity investment Bad outcome Good outcome
0 0 10 
20 0 52 
40 7 87 
Table 5.A.4 
Shareholder returns – credit guarantee
Equity investment Bad outcome Good outcome
0 0 45 
20 0 66 
40 7 87 